Thursday, August 23, 2012

Review of Lincoln and the Indians


In his 1978 book Lincoln and the Indians: Civil War Policy & Politics, David A. Nichols reviews and analyzes the policies towards American Indians characteristic of Lincoln’s presidency. He begins by asserting that past historians have neglected this field due to a misguided belief that the Civil War did not give him time to deal with Indian affairs or that Indian history has been mainly “an antiquarian study, segregated from the major developments of American history.”[1] He divides his book into three general sections. After briefly explaining the state of the Indian System before Lincoln’s election, he explains Lincoln’s policies towards the Southern tribes, particularly the ‘Five Civilized Tribes.’ He then discusses Indian relations in the Northwest, paying special attention to the Dakota War of 1962, and finally summarizes various attempts at reform that were made during Lincoln’s terms. Using secondary sources in addition to an abundance correspondence from major historical actors, Nichols successfully shows that Lincoln used Indian policy and politics as tools for his own career, alternately offering support or indifference as they suited his own political aims.
After a brief sketch highlighting the corruption and bureaucratic problems in the Indian system as it was inherited by Lincoln, Nichols explains the role that Southern tribes played in the Civil War. He argued that due to lack of protection by Union soldiers, offers of legislative representation in the Confederate government, geographical location, and some similar values such as slaveholding and limited federal interference in government, the majority of southern tribes allied with the Confederacy. Some Indian leaders, like Stand Watie, became vital to the Confederate military strategy. Due to the military advantage of holding the Oklahoma Territory as well as the high cost of Indian refugees pouring into Kansas, many of Lincoln’s advisors saw advantages in making a military incursion into Indian Territory. It is here where Nichols begins to paint very human portraits of the characters that he describes. Using their own correspondence, he shows how much progress of bogged down and underfunded due to political infighting and personality clashes between Generals Jim Lane and David Hunter. Due to these conflicts, the Territory never got the aid it needed and the refugees starved and died of infectious diseases while waiting. This problem was compounded later in the war due to the former alliance with the South which made aiding southern tribes a far less sympathetic and very politically dangerous task.
            After explaining how Lincoln’s policies affected southern tribes, Nichols gives what is likely the most solid evidence for his thesis when discussing Lincoln’s reaction to the Dakota War. The Dakota War in 1862 was likely begun after a confrontation between some Sioux men and some settlers, which resulted in five deaths.  Arguably, this stemmed from the consistently corrupt and unfair trade practices in the region which were cheating the Sioux out of their government annuities and causing tremendous hunger and hardship in the region. The reaction was several battles fought between the US Army, white settlers and the Sioux. When, in December, the last Sioux surrendered, over one thousand people, including women and children were kept as political prisoners. Most of the men were sentenced to death with very little due process. Lincoln, who needed to give the order for execution, delayed his decision for some time. Politically, either choice would be negative. Some missionaries like Henry Whipple, declared that most of the men sentenced were innocent, and that in this situation, charity was called for. Additionally, such a large mass execution would undoubtedly hurt the public image of the US and perhaps give European countries and excuse to offer aid to the Confederacy. However, the fevered situation of Minnesotans meant that if he did not approve the execution, he would lose many votes. His final compromise was extremely politically savvy. He elected to execute only thirty eight Sioux, while a fraction of the number sentenced, still the largest mass execution in US history. Thus he managed to placate humanitarians. However, he also allowed for the Sioux to be removed from their land in Minnesota, opening up new territory for white settlers and ensuring that his charity did not cost him votes. Once this matter was resolved, he did not return to it and left dozens of the prisoners to die in jail.
            Finally Nichols concludes his text with several chapters on reform attempts during Lincoln’s presidency. He discusses the failures of militarism in Colorado and New Mexico as well as the continued corruption in the federal bureaucracy of the Indian system. He also summarizes the various attempts of reformers like Whipple, Lane, John Pope, William Dole, and Morton Wilkinson. He discusses Lincoln’s initial endorsement of Indian reform in 1962[2] which was overshadowed by more vital national goals like the Manifest Destiny and racist attitudes affecting politicians including Lincoln. Eventually, by 1865, despite the large disturbances in the Indian system like the Dakota War and the Civil War, the system returned to normal, neither helped nor hindered in particular by Abraham Lincoln.
            Nichols’ book is interesting in many ways. He provides very interesting context for American Indian History and shows that it should not be segregated from Civil War history. His book as also very well written and his copious quotations from correspondence allow the reader to connect with many actors who are not as well known as Lincoln, particularly Whipple and Lane. He does lack perspective from the Indians, attempting to speak for them through humanitarians, but this is a deficit that he acknowledges in his introduction.  He also has a slight tendency to turn the Indians that he does discuss into victims. This may be fitting in most of his narrative, but his discussion of the Southern tribes involvement in the Civil War, it slightly minimizes the intelligence and value of the soldiers in the Army of the Trans-Mississippi and other Indian troops, especially considering that Watie was the last Confederate General to surrender. However, this book was extremely successful in providing a clear history of federal-Indian relations during the civil war and is a valuable text for anyone who studies American history.


[1] Nichols, David A. Lincoln and the Indians: Civil War Policy and Politics. Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1978. Print. p.
[2] Ibid p 144

No comments:

Post a Comment