Alfred Crosby's Children of the Sun

In his 2006 monograph Children of the Sun, historian Alfred Crosby analyzes the global history of human energy dependence, arguing that one of the prime movers of earth’s history has been the quest for more energy sources. Divided into three parts, Crosby’s text starts with three chapters on “The Largess of the Sun.” He argues that all early energy, whether through burning biomass for heat, or using solar energy to grow food, all human activity depended on the sun. The Columbian Exchange also relied on the sun since it is through the sun that wind its created with which to travel the globe. Additionally, the sun allowed certain plants to thrive or die in different environments, in directly causing the Great Potato famine of Ireland and then mass immigration to the US. This was one of his strongest sections, and drew heavily from his earlier and more famous books The Columbian Exchange and Ecological Imperialism. The second portion of his text, titled “Fossilized Sunshine,” addresses the history of fossil fuels and traditional non-renewable resources. Arguing that wind and water mills did not provide enough energy for the growing demand of the late sixteenth century Europe and Asia, with growing wood shortages, people turned to coal for production and heat. Using coal for rail travel also allowed for vast shipping networks of goods. The internal combustion engine and petroleum was an even more efficient medium for energy use and management. He ends this section with a discussion of electricity and its evolution from an entertainment device to a means of execution. His final section, “Energy at the Turn of the Third Millennium,” discusses fusion and fission energy. He concludes with a discussion of the limitations of our energy sources and suggestions that we may need to reexamine our usages.

Crosby’s text is interesting in many ways. First, it is a brief and well-written work on the history of energy usage. Each chapter served as an interesting and uncomplicated introduction to the history of a variety of non-human actors. In fact, whole books can, and have been written on the subjects of his individual twenty page chapters. He actually devotes little energy into creating a sophisticated argument, opting for a very straightforward narrative. Like Stephen Pyne, he addresses these forms of energy in terms of Bruno Latour’s hybrids though in a slightly less effective way than Pyne. For example, despite being a work that expands into pre-history, he does examine the sun and energy in strictly anthropocentric terms. Also like Pyne, his work does threaten to be reductionist, as he essentially asserts that the sun and its various sources of energy are the source of all human history. He is correct in that technically life would not exist on earth without the sun, but it is still a problematic historical claim as there are many other human motivations besides a quest for energy. Additionally, he heavily utilizes the first person plural, which while aiding in accessibility, is also problematic. For example, asserting that “we seized species of wild potatoes”[1] is very imprecise and even ahistorical as there is no way to know who seized those tubers and when and why. However, he does create a nice synthesis of contemporary historical theories, linking environmental history with the history of science and technology similar to that of Joy Parr’s Sensing Changes and Sarah Pritchard’s Confluence. Therefore this could be a useful text for introducing students to envirotechnical history but would not be useful for a serious study of energy history.

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[1] P. 27

Thomas Kuhn’s “Mathematical vs. Experimental Traditions in the Development of Physical Science”

In honor of Joseph Priestley's 279th birthday, I wanted to include a piece on the history of chemistry. However, since I do not have a piece on chemistry laying around and I really have no time to write one, I have opted to add an entry on Kuhn. This very much relates to Priestley since he was one of the last followers of phlogiston theory, protesting vehemently against Lavoisier's new chemistry. Therefore, in line with a Kuhnian Scientific Revolution, during the Chemical Revolution, Lavoisier's chemical theories fixed many anomalies of phlogiston, but were ultimately incommensurable with them and eventually succeeded them.

In his 1976 article “Mathematical vs. Experimental Traditions in the Development of Physical Science,” Thomas Kuhn explores the historiographical question: “Are the sciences one or many?”[1] He begins by presenting the common strengths and weaknesses of historical narratives that choose to accept either answer. Those historians who recognize science as “a loose-linked congeries of separate sciences,” are frequently attentive to the technical details of scientific knowledge, but tend to affix their subjects to modern definitions. Citing the history of electricity, he shows that the study of what is now considered to be electricity did not commence until the seventeenth century and that previous study of ‘electrical’ phenomena like lightning and electric eels were not connected and were not per say, electrical studies. As such, it neglects the contextual influences that actually shape the manner in which the science was produced. The other historiographical tradition presented by Kuhn “treats science as a single enterprise.” The primary criticism that he directs at this practice is the exact opposite of the previous tradition: instead of studying the evolving content of scientific study, they focus on the contextual framework within which it emerged. He then offers a possible solution to this debate by asserting that any historian who wishes to properly address scientific development must attempt to bridge the gap between the two traditional routes, neither assuming science to be one, nor passively accepting the scientific subdivisions set by modern science textbooks.

The lengthy remainder of Kuhn’s article is his own solution about how to divide the specifically the physical sciences into two groups: the classical or ‘mathematical’ physical sciences rooted in ancient Greece, astronomy, harmonics, mathematics, optics and statics, and the ‘Baconian’ or experimental disciplines of magnetism, electricity, and heat.[2] This narrative is interesting, accomplishing two primary feats. He successful offers an example of a historical narrative that takes the ‘middle ground’ of historical traditions, recognizing science as neither one nor many by showing distinctions between scientific disciplines while also showing external forces that allowed for their interactions. Additionally, he gives convincing narrative of how two entirely incommensurable traditions of scientific practices each contributed to the growth of physical sciences during the Scientific Revolution. Though he does not address other fields of science such as different biological traditions, medicine, or alchemy, his stated purpose was to provide his audience with an account of the physical sciences without extending much further.

Kuhn’s article is not free from criticism. In the epilogue of his Optics in the Age of Euler, Casper Hakfoort attempts to apply Kuhn’s thesis to his own study of Enlightenment optics, and while not arguing with Kuhn’s historiographical assertions, he argues that rather than sorting the physical sciences into two traditions, he adds a third division: natural philosophy. He cites Descartes’ work as being neither an extension of the Aristotelian traditions which governed the classical tradition nor resembling the growing experimentalism of Baconian science.[3] He contends that in the field of optics, studies were split between his three proposed traditions and believes that in general, it is more reasonable to source modern physics to the synthesis of all three traditions rather than, as Kuhn does, argue that modern physics came from the adoption of mathematical methods by the Baconian tradition.[4] HF Cohen, in his monograph The Scientific Revolution, also offers Kuhn several critiques. Like Hakfoort, Cohen refers to Descartes as a figure and optics as a discipline that do not fit strictly within Kuhn’s divisions. Additionally, he questions other figures and fields addressed by Kuhn like Galileo and statics that he contends do not neatly fit into Kuhn’s categories of physical science. Additionally, he notes that Kuhn mainly disregards the mechanical revolution which could be another tradition within the physical sciences leading to modern physics.[5]

Despite his critics, Kuhn’s attempt to reconcile two vastly different historiographical traditions is laudable, not only as a study of Early Modern physics, but more importantly as a novel, for its time, manner to examine the existing divisions between scientific disciplines. By using Kuhn as a model, historians can not only replicate his studies of physics, finding their own sweeping divisions but also apply his method to life sciences, chemistry, technology, and medicine. Using this template, perhaps on a larger scale, historians can more richly elucidate historical accounts rather than holding to older methods of studying either technical advances or social context.

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[1] Kuhn, Thomas S. "Mathematical vs. Experimental Traditions in the Development of Physical Science." Journal of Interdisciplinary History 1st ser. 7 (1976): 1. Print.

[2] Ibid p. 6

[3] Hakfoort, Casper. Optics in the Age of Euler: Conceptions of the Nature of Light, 1700-1795. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995. Print. p. 181

[4] Ibid p. 191

[5] Cohen, H F. The Scientific Revolution: A Historiographical Inquiry. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994. Print. 131-133

March 2nd 1972- Pioneer 10 launched into space

I would like to post something that is not a book review in honor of this day in history. Today I would like to celebrate  the day that forty years ago, NASA launched Pioneer 10 into space. This probe, which sent earth vital information and photos, was the first spacecraft to explore the outer planets. It left the solar system in 1983 radioing back the first data on interstellar space and continued send information back to NASA until the end of its mission in 1997. At the time, it had traveled over six billion miles.
But the future of Pioneer 10 is truly exciting. Headed toward the Taurus constellation, it is scheduled to pass close to the star Ross 246 in the year 346000 AD. Famous astronomer Carl Sagan designed a small plaque bolted onto the plaque that includes a drawing of a man and woman, a star map of our sun as well as the direction traveled by the probe. This message, intended for extra-terrestrials, will alert them to the existence of Earth.
We can for hope four things in the future of this inevitable encounter.
1) Humans still look similar to the images on the plaque after many thousands of years of evolution
2) The aliens do not want to conquer earth and eat our flesh, but like the Vulcans, come in peace
3) We have not already been exterminated in this future year, either by our own doing or another hostile alien nation from the Andromeda galaxy.
4) The rapture will not have occurred.

The Role of Facts in History and in the Physical Sciences

In his book What is History? E.H. Carr examines the role that historical facts play in historical method. He begins by asserting that many 19^th and early 20^th century historians sought an “ultimate history,”[1] an all inclusive canon, solving all previous historical problems. Their ideal method was studying and processing historical facts empirically without examining their own motivations or even the agendas of their sources. He explains that good history should acknowledge the context in which it was written and that historical facts are in fact subject to the prejudices of the historian. The relationship between the historian and his[2] facts marks the biggest divide between research methods in physical sciences and history. For historians, not only are facts disputable, but their discovery is not the end goal of a historical work. For physical scientists, as Bruno Latour and Thomas Kuhn contend, facts generally remain undisputed and the discovery of new facts is the primary goal of such scientists.

For Thomas Kuhn in his The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, the history of scientific inquiry is composed of a series of paradigms or sets of practices that define a scientific discipline in any particular time. For Kuhn, facts emerge as part of “normal science,” or scientific observations that confirm or perpetuate the standing paradigm. Though it is probable that scientific facts reflect the partialities of physical scientists, it is generally accepted in the scientific community that if science is practiced properly according to a widely accepted methodology, all scientists will reach the same factual conclusion. Additionally, facts are determined as correct by how well they fit within the set paradigm. Any observation that does not fit is identified as an anomaly and is either shelved or forced to fit the paradigm before it can be classified as a fact. Once a fact is determined, it generally goes unquestioned until a new a scientific revolution comes about. The goal of physical science is, consequently, to gather as many facts as possible to support a paradigm, which in itself is a grand-scale fact.[3]

The stationary nature of scientific facts is explored further in Bruno’s Latour’s sociological study of Science in Action. Latour determines that science is composed of a series of “black boxes.” He defines a black box as a scientific fact that despite its complexity, controversial history, or its relationship to the networks holding it in place only its “impact and output count.”[4] Once the relevant observations and associated social and scientific information is gathered and generally agreed upon by sets of allies, they become a black box which is never again questioned or ‘reopened’ unless a significant anomaly emerges. Though Latour describes massive commercial and academic networks behind scientific research, future scientists accept the resulting ‘fact’ usually unconcerned by agendas and external motivations that could have influenced the final product.[5] Future scientists then use the black boxes as a foundation upon which to build further black boxes.

According to Kuhn and Latour, scientific facts are a series of observations that once they  either support an existing paradigm or acquire a sufficient number of allies, they  remain static and immovable. They are also the broad-spectrum end goal of scientific practice. It is even frequently assumed by physical scientists that the entire natural world is composed of “facts” and it is the responsibility of the scientists to “discover” and present them, unfiltered, to the rest of society. Conversely, according to Carr, facts for historians are changeable and complex. Like in science, the identity of facts is determined by their relevance, but in history, that is decided by the individual historian. Additionally, although facts are an essential part of history, they alone do not comprise history. History is, instead, shaped by the interaction of historical observations and their relationship to the historian. Yet despite the differences between historical and scientific facts, it would be erroneous to ignore paradigms within historical study which, despite having a more varied interpretation of fact, still has tenable rules for what is acceptable in the larger historical community.

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[1] Carr, Edward H. What Is History? New York: Knopf, 1962 p 3

[2] Though I acknowledge that many historians and scientists are female, for the purposes of this paper I will retain the use of the male pronoun

[3] Kuhn, Thomas S. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970

[4] Latour, Bruno. Science in Action: How to Follow Scientists and Engineers Through Society. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1987 p.3

[5] Ibid