In his 1976 article “Mathematical vs. Experimental Traditions in the Development of Physical Science,” Thomas Kuhn explores the historiographical question: “Are the sciences one or many?”[1] He begins by presenting the common strengths and weaknesses of historical narratives that choose to accept either answer. Those historians who recognize science as “a loose-linked congeries of separate sciences,” are frequently attentive to the technical details of scientific knowledge, but tend to affix their subjects to modern definitions. Citing the history of electricity, he shows that the study of what is now considered to be electricity did not commence until the seventeenth century and that previous study of ‘electrical’ phenomena like lightning and electric eels were not connected and were not per say, electrical studies. As such, it neglects the contextual influences that actually shape the manner in which the science was produced. The other historiographical tradition presented by Kuhn “treats science as a single enterprise.” The primary criticism that he directs at this practice is the exact opposite of the previous tradition: instead of studying the evolving content of scientific study, they focus on the contextual framework within which it emerged. He then offers a possible solution to this debate by asserting that any historian who wishes to properly address scientific development must attempt to bridge the gap between the two traditional routes, neither assuming science to be one, nor passively accepting the scientific subdivisions set by modern science textbooks.
The lengthy remainder of Kuhn’s article is his own solution about how to divide the specifically the physical sciences into two groups: the classical or ‘mathematical’ physical sciences rooted in ancient Greece, astronomy, harmonics, mathematics, optics and statics, and the ‘Baconian’ or experimental disciplines of magnetism, electricity, and heat.[2] This narrative is interesting, accomplishing two primary feats. He successful offers an example of a historical narrative that takes the ‘middle ground’ of historical traditions, recognizing science as neither one nor many by showing distinctions between scientific disciplines while also showing external forces that allowed for their interactions. Additionally, he gives convincing narrative of how two entirely incommensurable traditions of scientific practices each contributed to the growth of physical sciences during the Scientific Revolution. Though he does not address other fields of science such as different biological traditions, medicine, or alchemy, his stated purpose was to provide his audience with an account of the physical sciences without extending much further.
Kuhn’s article is not free from criticism. In the epilogue of his Optics in the Age of Euler, Casper Hakfoort attempts to apply Kuhn’s thesis to his own study of Enlightenment optics, and while not arguing with Kuhn’s historiographical assertions, he argues that rather than sorting the physical sciences into two traditions, he adds a third division: natural philosophy. He cites Descartes’ work as being neither an extension of the Aristotelian traditions which governed the classical tradition nor resembling the growing experimentalism of Baconian science.[3] He contends that in the field of optics, studies were split between his three proposed traditions and believes that in general, it is more reasonable to source modern physics to the synthesis of all three traditions rather than, as Kuhn does, argue that modern physics came from the adoption of mathematical methods by the Baconian tradition.[4] HF Cohen, in his monograph The Scientific Revolution, also offers Kuhn several critiques. Like Hakfoort, Cohen refers to Descartes as a figure and optics as a discipline that do not fit strictly within Kuhn’s divisions. Additionally, he questions other figures and fields addressed by Kuhn like Galileo and statics that he contends do not neatly fit into Kuhn’s categories of physical science. Additionally, he notes that Kuhn mainly disregards the mechanical revolution which could be another tradition within the physical sciences leading to modern physics.[5]
Despite his critics, Kuhn’s attempt to reconcile two vastly different historiographical traditions is laudable, not only as a study of Early Modern physics, but more importantly as a novel, for its time, manner to examine the existing divisions between scientific disciplines. By using Kuhn as a model, historians can not only replicate his studies of physics, finding their own sweeping divisions but also apply his method to life sciences, chemistry, technology, and medicine. Using this template, perhaps on a larger scale, historians can more richly elucidate historical accounts rather than holding to older methods of studying either technical advances or social context.
[1] Kuhn, Thomas S. "Mathematical vs. Experimental Traditions in the Development of Physical Science." Journal of Interdisciplinary History 1st ser. 7 (1976): 1. Print.
[2] Ibid p. 6
[3] Hakfoort, Casper. Optics in the Age of Euler: Conceptions of the Nature of Light, 1700-1795. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995. Print. p. 181
[4] Ibid p. 191
[5] Cohen, H F. The Scientific Revolution: A Historiographical Inquiry. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994. Print. 131-133
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