In his book What is History? E.H. Carr examines the role that historical facts play in historical method. He begins by asserting that many 19th and early 20th century historians sought an “ultimate history,”[1] an all inclusive canon, solving all previous historical problems. Their ideal method was studying and processing historical facts empirically without examining their own motivations or even the agendas of their sources. He explains that good history should acknowledge the context in which it was written and that historical facts are in fact subject to the prejudices of the historian. The relationship between the historian and his[2] facts marks the biggest divide between research methods in physical sciences and history. For historians, not only are facts disputable, but their discovery is not the end goal of a historical work. For physical scientists, as Bruno Latour and Thomas Kuhn contend, facts generally remain undisputed and the discovery of new facts is the primary goal of such scientists.
For Thomas Kuhn in his The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, the history of scientific inquiry is composed of a series of paradigms or sets of practices that define a scientific discipline in any particular time. For Kuhn, facts emerge as part of “normal science,” or scientific observations that confirm or perpetuate the standing paradigm. Though it is probable that scientific facts reflect the partialities of physical scientists, it is generally accepted in the scientific community that if science is practiced properly according to a widely accepted methodology, all scientists will reach the same factual conclusion. Additionally, facts are determined as correct by how well they fit within the set paradigm. Any observation that does not fit is identified as an anomaly and is either shelved or forced to fit the paradigm before it can be classified as a fact. Once a fact is determined, it generally goes unquestioned until a new a scientific revolution comes about. The goal of physical science is, consequently, to gather as many facts as possible to support a paradigm, which in itself is a grand-scale fact.[3]
The stationary nature of scientific facts is explored further in Bruno’s Latour’s sociological study of Science in Action. Latour determines that science is composed of a series of “black boxes.” He defines a black box as a scientific fact that despite its complexity, controversial history, or its relationship to the networks holding it in place only its “impact and output count.”[4] Once the relevant observations and associated social and scientific information is gathered and generally agreed upon by sets of allies, they become a black box which is never again questioned or ‘reopened’ unless a significant anomaly emerges. Though Latour describes massive commercial and academic networks behind scientific research, future scientists accept the resulting ‘fact’ usually unconcerned by agendas and external motivations that could have influenced the final product.[5] Future scientists then use the black boxes as a foundation upon which to build further black boxes.
According to Kuhn and Latour, scientific facts are a series of observations that once they either support an existing paradigm or acquire a sufficient number of allies, they remain static and immovable. They are also the broad-spectrum end goal of scientific practice. It is even frequently assumed by physical scientists that the entire natural world is composed of “facts” and it is the responsibility of the scientists to “discover” and present them, unfiltered, to the rest of society. Conversely, according to Carr, facts for historians are changeable and complex. Like in science, the identity of facts is determined by their relevance, but in history, that is decided by the individual historian. Additionally, although facts are an essential part of history, they alone do not comprise history. History is, instead, shaped by the interaction of historical observations and their relationship to the historian. Yet despite the differences between historical and scientific facts, it would be erroneous to ignore paradigms within historical study which, despite having a more varied interpretation of fact, still has tenable rules for what is acceptable in the larger historical community.
[1] Carr, Edward H. What Is History? New York: Knopf, 1962 p 3
[2] Though I acknowledge that many historians and scientists are female, for the purposes of this paper I will retain the use of the male pronoun
[3] Kuhn, Thomas S. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970
[4] Latour, Bruno. Science in Action: How to Follow Scientists and Engineers Through Society. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1987 p.3
[5] Ibid
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